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Abstract
Irrigated agriculture has come under close scrutiny in Europe recently because of its high share of total water
consumption and its apparent inefficiency. Several water policies have been advocated, in particular the use of economic
instruments such as water markets. This paper simulates the impact of a policy based upon water markets on agricultural
production in the internal river basins of Catalonia (Spain). This zone presents certain particularities that make it very
interesting to study: competition between sectors for the resource (agriculture-urban consumption-recreational uses),
recent periods of resource insufficiency and conflicts between irrigators as a result of the measures taken by the hydraulic
administration in drought situations. The results show that these markets would guarantee an optimal reassignment of the
resource in situations of supply restrictions, and although compared to the situation without markets they would not mean
higher economic profits for the irrigators, they could prevent conflicts between them. Nevertheless, doubts exist about
their acceptance by irrigators.
Additional key words: irrigated agriculture, multicriteria decision models.
Resumen
Evaluación de mercados de aguas de riego en las cuencas internas de Cataluña (España)
Últimamente se ha puesto en duda el papel económico del regadío en Europa, debido al elevado consumo de agua que
representa, así como a su aparente baja eficiencia de uso. Al mismo tiempo, las políticas tradicionales de gestión de aguas
están en entredicho, surgiendo nuevos planteamientos, destacando entre ellos el uso de instrumentos económicos como
los mercados de aguas. Este artículo analiza el impacto sobre la producción agrícola de la instauración de mercados de
aguas en un área de riego comunitario ubicada en las cuencas internas de Cataluña (España). Esta zona presenta ciertas
particularidades que hacen que su estudio sea especialmente interesante: se trata de un área con una elevada competencia
intersectorial por el uso del recurso (agricultura-consumo urbano-usos recreativos), recientes periodos de insuficiencia en
el suministro y conflictos entre regantes como resultado de las medidas tomadas por la administración hidráulica en caso
de sequía. Los resultados obtenidos muestran que los mercados garantizan una reasignación óptima del recurso en
situaciones de restricción del suministro, y aunque globalmente no generan una ganancia económica muy elevada
respecto a la situación sin mercado, sí podrían evitar conflictos entre regantes. Sin embargo, existen dudas sobre su
aceptación práctica por parte de dichos regantes.
Palabras clave adicionales: agricultura de regadío, modelos de decisión multicriterio.
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Introduction
Agriculture is not only the greatest water user of the
world in terms of volume, it is also a relatively low
value, low efficiency and highly subsidised user (FAO,
1995). In Europe, irrigated land doubled from 1975
to 1995 and in Spain, the European country with
the largest area of irrigated land, it already exceeds
3,500,000 ha (FAO, 2004).
Numerous authors point to the importance of
economic instruments in the management of water to
improve water use efficiency (Grimble, 1999). In this
same sense, water policy has become an important
issue during the past few years, and political consensus
has moved in the direction of modernising legislation.
In 1995 the European Commission and Parliament
initiated the process of developing a Common Policy
on Water, as part of Article 130R of the Treaty of
the Union that empowers the European Commission
to protect the environment. Many issues have been
barriers to early agreement, but one of the most difficult
has probably been Article 9 in the first drafts of the
proposal, which originally obliged EU members to
charge the full cost of water to users. The final result
has been Directive 2000/60/CE (OJ, 2000), the «Water
Framework Directive» (WFD). This Directive
establishes that EU members should try to recover all
water service costs, including environmental costs, in
accordance with the «polluter pays principle», aimed at
social and environmental sustainability. This is an
example of the importance of economic instruments to
improve water management in Europe.
Also, new water laws appearing in Spain recognised
the importance of economic instruments. In this
country, ownership of water resources belongs to the
State, but the right to use the water may be obtained
through government concessions granted by the
regional water authorities. The Consolidated text of
the Water Act (Royal Decree 1/2001, 20th July 2001)
legalises water markets in Spanish territory, but it
imposes a series of restrictions. One of the most
important is that water transfers must be made from
one use to another of the same category or of a
higher category according to the order of preference
established in the Hydrological Plan of the
corresponding basin, which generally is: urban supply;
agriculture; electrical energy production; industry;
aquaculture; recreational uses; navigation and water
transport; and other uses.
Considering these restrictions, the law offers
new possibilities in water management using market
mechanisms to improve the allocation efficiency.
There is no doubt about the seriousness of the
application of a water pricing policy for the future of
irrigated lands, since it will presumably have a negative
influence on their competitiveness and the surrounding
socio-economic conditions (Gómez-Limón and Berbel,
2000), although in certain cases there are studies that
suggest the opposite (Doppler et al., 2002). A complete
revision of the water demand policies (including
studies and experiences concerning pricing policies and
water markets) can be consulted in Sumpsi et al. (1998,
Chapter 3).
Also, the effects of applying economic instruments
to water management will vary according to the
specific characteristics of the zone where these
measures are applied. The WFD recognises the
importance of the particularities of each zone and
requires each state to carry out an economic study of
the use of the water in each hydrographic area.
The objective of the present work was to study the
viability of agricultural water markets to improve
irrigation water management in the internal river basins
of Catalonia at two levels: intra-irrigator community and
inter-irrigator community. It is desirable to analyse this
improvement with respect to the present system of water
allocation in conditions of insufficient water provision.
Case study
This study has been carried out in the six main
irrigation communities of the Muga and Ter Rivers,
which form the third most important irrigation zone
of Catalonia (after the Zona de Ponent in Lleida and
the Terres de l’Ebre in Tarragona), and the most
important zone of the internal river basins. An
irrigation community is a grouping of all the owners
of a same irrigable zone, united by law for the
independent and common administration of public
waters. Figure 1 shows the location of the studied
communities of irrigators.
The analysis of this zone is especially interesting
because it has not been the object of previous studies of
this nature, and it is an area with particular problems:
strong inter-sectoral competition for the use of the
resource and the existence of latent conflict between
irrigators in drought situations.
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Currently, the annual water consumption in the zone
of study is 246.3 hm3 year–1. This consumption is
distributed between sectors in the following way: 70%
corresponds to the agricultural sector (including the
needs of golf courses), 20% to domestic demand and
10% to the industrial sector (DMA, 2002).
Domestic demand has a seasonal character, caused
by consumption resulting from tourism and
concentrated during the summer season: the average
monthly demand increases by 51% during the peak
period (July). The interest in completely satisfying this
demand is obvious: tourism provides around 10% of
the Gross Domestic Product of Catalonia. Specifically,
tourism on the Costa Brava (in the same zone as the
case study) generated 2,940.6 million euros in 2002,
28% of the total generated by tourism for all of
Catalonia (Oliver, 2002).
In this irrigated area the agricultural sector is the
largest water consumer. For this sector, as well as
the urban sector, problems of seasonal variation are
focused on the summer months. Another problem
related to this use is ground water pollution by nitrates.
In 1998 the zone was declared vulnerable to nitrates
and some of the potentially polluting husbandry
practices were restricted (DOGC, 1998).
The six irrigation communities have been divided
into three groups on the basis of similarities in technical
characteristics and geographical proximity: the Muga,
the Lower Ter and the Middle Ter. In these zones the
main cultures are corn, sunflower, other grain cereals,
alfalfa, fruit trees and sorghum. Other important
cultures are poplars and ornamental trees in the Middle
Ter, and rice in the Lower Ter. Table 1 summarises the
main characteristics of these groups of communities.
Common characteristics are the organization of
irrigation by turns, the predominance of gravity
irrigation (with the limited presence of drip irrigation in
fruit trees and sprinkle irrigation in cereals), and the
existence of important problems concerning the state of
irrigation water transport infrastructures and the lack of
resources to repair them.
In addition, there are important recreational uses
of water, such as golf. In the studied zone, there are
three golf courses and one pitch and putt. According
to Priestley and Sabí (1993), the average water
consumption for an 18 hole golf course in Catalonia is
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Figure 1. Location of the six communities of irrigators studied.
325,976 m3 year–1, a consumption comparable with that
of a town of 10,000 inhabitants. The current tendency
of the Administration is to promote this irrigation with
treated waste water.
In the internal river basins of Catalonia the
responsibility for hydraulic management is in the hands
of the ACA (Catalan Water Agency) of the Catalan
Government. In the years in which there have been
resource shortage problems (1999, 2000, 2002) the
ACA has adopted measures to limit the amount of
water used in each hydrographic river basin, as well as
the allocations destined to certain specific uses, always
giving priority to urban supply. The procedure has been
one of decree promulgation, with consequences for the
agricultural and recreational sectors.
In the most extreme case, the application of these
restrictions imposed on irrigated agricultural land
meant that in 1999, in the zone of the Muga, there was
practically no irrigation. Within the agricultural sector
there exists a preferential treatment for fruit trees,
based on the idea that «the adopted measures cannot
produce irreversible damages in the permanent fruit
cultures». The justification is that they are cultures
with high establishment costs and a long period of
amortization. Nevertheless, this situation has created
fierce controversies among irrigators: there have been
complaints about fruit producers irrigating in excess,
not only to ensure the survival of their groves but also
to ensure profitable production, while neighbouring
cereal producers lose their harvests by not being able
to irrigate. Criticisms have also come from other
sectors, such as the producers of ornamental ligneous
plants, which are also perennial cultures with high
establishment costs.
The year 2005 has also been a drought year, and the
previously commented problems continue.
Methodology
Field data have been used to create a model to
evaluate the result of implementing water markets at
both the intra-community and inter-community levels.
The method chosen is based on a demand simulation
for the different irrigating groups by means of a
multi-criteria analysis.
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Table 1. Characteristics of the groups of communities of irrigators studied
Groups of communities Muga Middle Ter Lower Ter
,
Communities
Marge Esquerre del Muga and
Marge Dret del Muga
Cervià de Ter, Sant Jordi
Desvalls i Colomers and
Sèquia Vinyals
Presa de Colomers and Sèquia
del Molí de Pals
,
,
Surface (ha) 5,220 1,500 7,100
,
,
Number of irrigators 1,200 625 2,192
,
,
Type of water tariff 1 By irrigable surface
By irrigated surface (Cervià de
Ter, Sant Jordi Desvalls i
Colomers) or by irrigable sur-
face (Sèquia Vinyals)
By irrigated surface (Sèquia
del Molí de Pals) or by irriga-
ble surface (Presa de
Colomers)
,
,
Tariff value (€ ha–1) 25-42 54-120 6-87
,
,
Water provision
Depending on the availability;
26 hm3 in a year without
restriction (1997)
Concession of 2,038 L s–1
throughout the year
Concession March to October,
variable according to the
month of the year
,
,
Water restrictions
Frequent; in 1999 no water
was distributed
Infrequent, but in 1999 there
were restrictions
Infrequent
,
1 Water tariff by irrigable surface means that the irrigators pay according to the land surface capable of being irrigated, while by irrigated
surface means that they pay according to the actual irrigated surface.
Obtaining field data
The field data were obtained through face-to-face
interviews with a sample of irrigators (170 farmers).
The total farmed surface of the sample was 25% of the
irrigable surface area of the studied zone. The
sampling was done by irrigator communities and
by quotas within each community. The factor used
in the definition of the quotas was the farmer’s surface
area. The farms of the sample were chosen
to reproduce the same distribution of farm surface
areas existing in the population. Farms smaller than
one hectare were excluded. Information was requested
from the irrigators about their production decisions and
their opinions of water markets. The complete
questionnaire can be consulted in Pujol (2002).
Classification of the irrigators
The irrigators’ production decisions (crop surfaces)
were analysed, similarities were searched for and the
irrigators were grouped accordingly. Cluster analysis
was applied using Ward’s algorithm (Ward, 1963).
Ward’s method uses an analysis of variance approach
to evaluate the distances between clusters. Cluster
membership is assessed by calculating the total sum of
squared deviations from the mean of a cluster. The
criterion for fusion is that it should produce the
smallest possible increase in the error sum of squares.
This involves finding the mean of each cluster and
the distance to each object contained in each cluster,
squaring these distances and summing the squared
distances for all the objects in all the clusters. In
general, this method is regarded as very efficient;
however, it tends to create small sized clusters (Jain
et al., 1999). The analysis was made separately for
each one of the three groups of irrigation communities.
The model was created based on clusters obtained
from the decisions on production, assuming that the
irrigators who make different decisions about
production have different objectives. Based on
productive orientation and location, eleven types of
irrigators have been identified (Table 2). The type
names are self-explanatory: ‘corn’ refers to farms that
specialise in extensive crops in general, with a high
percentage of corn, while ‘mixed’ implies that there is
no predominant crop, with farms cultivating cereals,
sunflowers, and even a small proportion of fruit trees.
‘Livestock’ means that fodder crops for animal feeding
cover a large part of the cultivated area. Finally, ‘fruit’
refers to farms with a high proportion of orchard
cultivation (apples, primarily), while ‘ornamental’
farms cultivate only garden trees and plants.
The clusters obtained are consistent with the
empirically observed results: clusters define groups of
farmers with appreciably different behaviours.
Obtaining the utility function
The next phase was to obtain the utility function. In
order to model the irrigators’ decision-making
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Table 2. Surrogate utility function weights by farm type and location
Zone Productive orientation
Weight for criteria
GM maximisation Labour minimisation Risk minimisation
,
Muga
Corn 0.99833 0.00078 0.00089
Livestock 1 0 0
Mixed 0.92985 0 0.07015
,
,
Lower Ter
Mixed 0.92154 0 0.07846
Fruit 0.99796 0 0.00204
Livestock 1 0 0
Corn 1 0 0
,
,
Middle Ter
Corn 1 0 0
Mixed 0.7635 0.2365 0
Livestock 1 0 0
Ornamental 1 0 0
,
process, it was necessary to either adopt a classic
approach, supposing that the irrigators optimise a
single objective (i.e. profit), or to assume that they
consider several objectives simultaneously. Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) first explained
economic acts as not only the result of profit (as a
deterministic variable) but also of risk (expected
utility theory). Many other authors have also
supported the multiplicity of objectives in agricultural
activities (see Romero and Rehman, 2003).
One approach to the multi-criteria decision-making
paradigm is the multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT).
It is often argued that MAUT has the soundest
theoretical structure of all the multi-criteria techniques
(Ballestero and Romero, 1998). In MAUT, the utility of
an alternative option (i) is captured in a quantitative
way via a utility function:
U = Ui (ri1, ri2, ..., riq) = f{u1 (ri1), u2 (ri2), ..., uq (riq)}
= 1, ..., n; j = 1, ..., q
where Ui is the utility value of the alternative i, i is an
alternative, j is an attribute, rij is the value of attribute j
for alternative i, and uj is the utility value for attribute j.
If these attributes are mutually utility-independent,
the formulation becomes, in simple additive form:
[1]
where wj is the weight of attribute j, and it is often
assumed that 0  wj  1 and  wj = 1 (Keeney, 1974).
The additive utility function has been widely used to
model farmers’ decisions when one of the criteria
involved is uncertainty. The ranking of alternatives is
obtained by adding contributions from each attribute.
Since attributes are measured in terms of different
units, normalisation is required to permit addition. The
weighting of each attribute expresses its relative
importance.
Fishburn (1982) presents the mathematical
requirements for assuming an additive function. These
conditions are restrictive, but Edwards (1977) and Farmer
(1987) have shown that the additive function yields
extremely close approximations to the hypothetical true
function even when these conditions are not satisfied. In
Hwang and Yoon’s words (1981, p. 103): «theory,
simulation computations, and experience all suggest that
the additive method yields extremely close
approximations to very much more complicated
non-linear forms, while remaining far easier to use and
understand». Although the assumption of linearity of the
individual attribute utility function is rather strong, the
validation of the model supports this decision.
The ability to simulate real decision-makers’
preferences is based on the estimation of relative
weightings. The methodology selected is weighted goal
programming, which avoids interaction with farmers
and in which the utility function is elicited on the basis
of the revealed preferences implicit in the actual values
of decision variables (i.e. the crop plan in farm
management). Previous uses of this methodology can
be found in Amador et al. (1998), Berbel and
Rodríguez-Ocaña (1998), Arriaza et al. (2002).
The method may be summarised as follows:
a) Each attribute is defined as a mathematical
function (fj) of an alternative, i.e., a concrete combination
value of the decision variables x (e.g. crop area); fj = fj(x).
These attributes are proposed a priori as the most relevant
decision criteria used by farmers (objectives).
b) The pay-off matrix is calculated, where fjj’ is the
value of the j-th objective when the j’-th objective
is optimised. The main diagonal is the ‘ideal’ point
defined by the individually obtained optimum (f*j), the
value of the j-th objective when it is optimised.
c) The following q+1 system of equations is solved
[2]
where q is the number of a priori relevant objectives,
wi’ are the weights attached to each objective (the
solution), fjj’ are the elements of the pay-off matrix, and
fj the real values reached in the observed behaviour of
farmers, as obtained by direct observation.
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d) Normally, there is not an exact solution to
system [2] and it is therefore necessary to solve a
problem by minimising the sum of deviational
variables that find the closest set of weights.
[3]
where nj and pj are negative and positive deviations,
respectively.
Dyer (1977) demonstrates that the weights obtained
in [3] are consistent with the following separable and
additive utility function.
where kj is a normalising factor (e.g. the difference
between maximum and minimum values for objective j
in the pay-off matrix).
Following the multi-criteria methodology, a model
for each farm type and irrigation community group has
been built.
The crop plan selected will determine changes in
certain attributes of the system. Attributes are relevant
functions that are deduced from the decision variables, but
as has been mentioned before, not all attributes are
relevant to the decision-makers. Fertiliser consumption,
for example, may be an attribute of interest to policy
makers but irrelevant for producers (they consider the cost
of the fertiliser to be important, not the amount).
Attributes to which decision makers assign a desired
direction of improvement are considered to be objectives.
The main elements of the mathematical model used are:
a) Variables:
Each farmer member of the irrigation community
group has a set of variables Xi (crops), as described in the
previous section. These are the decision variables that
may assume any value belonging to the feasible set.
b) Objectives:
In order to obtain the utility function, three
objectives must be regarded as belonging to the
farmer’s decision-making process:
• Profit maximisation, estimated as the maximum
attainable expected gross margin (GM).
• Risk minimisation, measured as the minimisation
of total absolute deviation (MOTAD), proposed by
Hazell (1971) (see also Watts et al., 1984) as a linear
estimator of variance.
• Minimisation of labour inputs, in terms of hours of
labour required (LAB).
The first two objectives are classic in agricultural
economics: a large number of studies quote their
importance in farm decision-making. The third has
been included as a consequence of our field research
and is regarded as a priori relevant by experts and
farmers.
c) Constraints:
• Land constraint. The sum of all crops must be
equal to the area assigned to each farm type.
• Common Agrarian Policy (CAP) constraints. It is
assumed the CAP regulation regarding subsidised crop
area requirements.
• Rotational constraints. Alfalfa is the sole
non-annual herbaceous crop, remaining in the ground
for four years, after which it cannot be sown again for
three years (the salutary interval before repeating
alfalfa in the same plot). Corn cultivation after rice and
the corn cultivation frequency have also been limited.
• Market constraints. The area of some crops
(ornamentals and orchards) is limited to the maximum
area utilised in the period 1997-2000.
• Type of soil constraints. In the wetlands only rice
can be cultivated. Also, there are zones near the rivers
and with low quality soils where only poplars and
winter cereals can be cultivated.
In all the restrictions it is considered that the surface
available for the herbaceous cultures is the surface not
occupied by ligneous cultures, which present a much
more prolonged occupation of the ground. The detailed
model can be studied in Pujol (2002).
The weights of the different objectives of the utility
functions corresponding to each one of the productive
orientations are found in Table 2.
Validation
Validation of the estimated utility functions was
based on comparing the real decisions about production
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in the present situation with the model predictions
when the irrigator maximises the model’s utility
function. The comparison of model predictions with
real system outputs is, in practice, a common procedure
to validate models (Qureshi et al., 1999).
Specifically, the existing differences between the
percentage distributions of cultures in the actual
situation and the predictions of the model for each
productive orientation have been compared.
The predicted and observed values of decisions
on production are compared in Table 3. The only
considerable deviations between the model and reality
take place in ‘mixed’ productive orientations of corn
and sunflowers in the Muga and the Middle Ter.
Nevertheless, in general terms the model can be
considered acceptable.
Obtaining the water demand curves
In order to obtain the water demand curves
corresponding to each productive orientation, the point
of departure is its utility function. In the calculation of
the gross margin an additional cost must be included:
the price of the water. Successive increases in the price
of the water have been considered, supposing the
application of volumetric tariffs, and starting from a
price level of zero, equivalent to the present situation
(in which the irrigators only pay a surface tariff, not in
function of the volume of water consumed). Each price
level is a scenario in which the utility function is
maximised. The set of obtained water consumptions
forms the demand function. This process was repeated
for each productive orientation.
The demand curves obtained allow the consequences
of possible tariff increases resulting from a more or less
strict application of the WFD to be deduced and
compared with the current situation.
Simulation of the water markets
The simulation of water markets was made using the
methodology developed by Arriaza et al. (2002), who
applied their model in south western Spain. Our case
study applied the methodology to north eastern Spain
in quite different socio-economic and agronomic
contexts.
In order to simulate the market, the joint
performance of the demands of the various existing
productive orientations, as well as the existence of a
limited supply of water, determined by the hydraulic
authorities, was analysed. The simulation assumed
perfect competition and the non-existence of
transaction costs. The model is explained in detail and
an example is developed in the results section.
The simulation was made at two levels:
intra-community and inter-community. The first case
supposed a market where only the farmers who belong
to the same zone compete. Three intra-community
water markets were simulated: the Muga, the Middle
Ter and the Lower Ter.
In the second case an inter-community water market
was simulated. It was assumed that the irrigators of
a same river basin (the Ter) could transfer part
of their supply to each other, with no need for new
infrastructures. This would not be possible in the case
of communities pertaining to different river basins,
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Table 3. Deviations between real and simulated values of the percentage of cultivated surface
Muga Lower Ter Middle Ter
Corn Livestock Mixed Mixed Fruit Livestock Corn Corn Mixed Livestock Ornamental
,
Corn –3.21 3.24 –11.45 –3.53 –0.72 0.55 1.09 5.80 –13.00 –1.67 0.00
Sunflower 2.32 0.00 12.60 4.34 0.93 0.00 0.14 0.00 13.10 0.00 0.00
Grain cereal 0.00 1.61 0.00 0.00 –2.18 0.98 –0.09 0.00 –0.90 2.47 0.00
Winter forage 0.00 –1.37 0.00 0.00 1.85 –0.83 0.07 0.00 0.77 –2.10 0.00
Alfalfa 2.96 –1.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.76 0.00
Rice 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Fruit trees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ornamental trees 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poplars 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Set-aside –2.07 –1.61 –1.15 –0.81 0.12 –0.98 –1.29 –5.61 –0.20 –2.23 0.00
,
since infrastructures that do not exist at present would
be required to physically transfer the water. Therefore,
a water market between the Lower Ter and the Middle
Ter was simulated, and the average water demands of
these two zones were analysed.
Results
Obtaining the water demand curves
The methodology described above was employed
with the aim of improving predictions of farmers’
behaviour, which in turn would provide better
predictions for policy analysis. Applying the weights
estimated for the surrogate utility function found
in Table 2, normalised to different prices of water,
generates a demand curve when the utility function is
maximised for different water prices. The aggregated
water demand curves have also been generated. In
these cases, the demands of the individual farm types
have been added, weighed according to the importance
of their surface area.
Figure 2 shows an example of water demand curves
for the Lower Ter irrigation community group. This
figure shows the demand of the four productive
orientations and also the average demand for the
zone. The differences between the demands of the
different irrigators, closely linked to the economic value
of output, can be observed. In this sense, the behaviour
of the demand curve of the fruit orientation is
remarkable because it obtains a higher gross margin of
its production than the other orientations. This difference
in demand demonstrates the potential for a water market
and implies that irrigators might potentially be interested
in participating in it.
Simulation of the water markets
The simulation methodology can be explained
taking the Lower Ter community group as an example.
Fig. 2 illustrates the analysis. A water quota imposed
by the hydraulic authorities of 4,000 m3 ha–1 has been
simulated. Point E defines aggregated demand
(computed by multiplying each farm type demand by
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Figure 2. Water market in the Lower Ter for a quota of 4,000 m3 ha–1.
its area) for this quota, and Pe is the corresponding
equilibrium price. At this price, different farm types, A’
(‘livestock’), X’ (‘mixed’), M’ (‘corn’), F’ (‘fruit’),
demand quantities of water which are different from the
4,000 m3 ha–1 available.
Consequently, under conditions without transaction
costs, if a market is created, quantities bought and sold
by farmers will maintain the average global
consumption (Q = 4,000 m3 ha–1) but will search for a
new equilibrium since transactions will imply that the
utility of water is higher for the ‘fruit trees’ and
‘livestock’ farm types and lower for ‘mixed’ (Pf > Pe
and Pa > Pe, and Px < Pe). Water will be sold by
‘mixed’ users, moving from X to X’, while ‘livestock’
moves from A to A’ and ‘fruit’ moves from F to F’.
‘Corn’ is almost in equilibrium and there are no water
transactions as M lies just above the aggregated average
for Q = 4,000 m3 ha–1 (Pe  0.05€m–3 and Pm = Pe).
As can be seen, for this quota the marginal utility
measured in monetary terms corresponding to the
aggregate demand is close to 0.05 € m–3, which almost
coincides with the marginal utility of the farm type
‘corn’ but is higher than that of ‘mixed’ and lower than
that of ‘livestock’ and ‘fruit’.
In this case, if a water market is opened up, with
the assumptions of no transaction costs and perfect
competition, the water use of the ‘corn’ farm type will
remain unchanged while ‘mixed’ will sell water to
‘fruit’and ‘livestock’. Tables 4 and 5 summarise the
results of the application of internal markets, limited to
each community irrigation group, in different situations
of water availability. The two tables present the
situations corresponding to different equilibrium
prices, and each price corresponds to an amount of
water supply.
However, a market could also be established between
the Middle and Lower Ter communities. In this case an
interesting result is obtained because, as Table 6 shows,
transfers move from the Middle to the Lower Ter when
water is slightly limited while water goes in the opposite
direction as water scarcity increases.
Discussion
Utility functions
As opposed to many other works, where the
relevance of the multiplicity of objectives in irrigator
decision-making has been demonstrated (Zekri
and Romero, 1992; Sumpsi et al., 1996; Amador et al.,
1998; Berbel and Rodríguez-Ocaña, 1998; Gómez-
Limón and Berbel, 2000; Bazzani et al., 2002; and
Gómez-Limón et al., 2002), in this case study the
high-priority objective is the maximisation of the gross
margin. According to the results obtained, only some
farm types consider the minimisation of manual labour
and the minimisation of risk to be objectives. Therefore,
in many cases, the use of a mono criterion model in the
simulation could be justified.
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Table 4. Internal markets limited to each irrigation community group. General data
Transaction price (€ m–3)
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09
Muga
Allocation (hm3 per 100 ha) 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.26 0.18
Total market transaction (hm3) 0.89 0.78 0.84 3.91 0.49
% traded water over quota 3.19 2.82 3.09 28.44 50.66
Value of market (€  1000) 8.92 23.43 42.33 273.52 43.80
Lower Ter
Supply (hm3 per 100 ha) 0.60 0.60 0.50 0.25 0.13
Total market transaction (hm3) 3.04 3.05 6.83 9.30 7.76
% traded water over quota 7.11 7.16 19.06 53.12 81.00
Value of market (€  1000) 30.41 91.64 341.68 650.78 698.20
Middle Ter
Supply (hm3 per 100 ha) 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.45 0.26
Total market transaction (hm3) 2.01 2.08 2.21 2.42 2.97
% traded water over quota 24.63 26.16 29.24 35.61 76.30
Value of market (€  1000) 20.14 62.52 110.70 169.70 267.21
Water demand curves
All the demand curves obtained present similar
characteristics. At low price levels, the demand is
relatively inelastic: starting from the present situation,
small tariff increases would modify little or not at all
(according to the farm type) the demand for water.
Nevertheless, when the tariff increases, all the curves
present a very elastic zone, from which new price
increases would cause drastic changes in demand and,
therefore, in decisions on production and the gross
margins obtained. Finally, at very high tariff levels,
the demand returns to being elastic (it is the zone in which
the irrigator produces dry land cultures). These results
coincide with those obtained in other studies such as those
of Berbel and Gomez-Limón (2000), Gómez-Limón and
Berbel (2000) and Arriaza et al. (2002).
Water markets
In the case of applying internal markets limited to
each community irrigation group (Tables 4 and 5), the
farmers might achieve higher levels of utility if a
market was available, the reason being that each farmer
buys/sells his water, improving his result until the
increase in marginal utility from selling water is offset
by the reductions in gross margins from crop
production.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 show that water market
transactions reach their maximum level when water
availability is low (2,000 to 3,000 m3 ha–1). In all the
cases, the existence of a market under conditions of
water restriction improves the social welfare of farmers
(measured as an aggregate utility function value)
vis-à-vis a non-market situation.
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Table 5. Internal markets within each irrigation community group. Transactions by farm type (m3 ha–1) and by transaction
price (€ m–3)
Transaction price (€ m–3)
0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09
Farm types
buying (m3 ha–1)
Muga
Corn 701 745 811 –645 –172
Livestock 96 2 –138 2,339 –184
Mixed –356 –312 –246 –1,291 194
Lower Ter
Mixed –1,076 –1,066 –2,831 –2,465 –1,349
Fruit 2,254 2,264 3,226 5,010 5,751
Livestock –95 –169 503 2,980 –1,349
Corn –146 –136 826 –1,346 –1,349
Middle Ter
Corn 205 346 609 –2,999 –2,412
Mixed –4,569 –4,638 –5,047 –4,539 –2,594
Livestock –46 –116 –32 221 –2,594
Ornamental 5,749 5,890 6,153 6,661 8,606
Negative quantities refer to water sold and positive quantities to water bought.
Table 6. Inter-community water market transactions
Price (€ m–3) 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09
Allocation (hm3 100ha–1) 0.59 0.59 0.50 0.28 0.16
Area buying (m3 ha–1)
Lower Ter 99 122 0 –362 –217
Middle Ter –470 –578 –1 1,712 1,028
Total market transaction (hm3) 0.70 0.87 0.00 2.57 1.54
% transaction over volume 1.38 1.71 0.00 10.56 11.45
Value of market (€  1000) 7.05 26.01 0.07 179.76 138.79
In the section «area buying», negative quantities refer to water sold and positive quantities to water bought.
In the case of intra-community markets, comparing
the utility increases between the ‘with market’ situation
and the ‘without market’ situation for different supply
levels leads to the following observations.
In the Muga the maximum utility increases in the
‘corn’ orientation occur for low levels of restriction
(supply higher than 5,350 m3 ha–1), in which case the
increase of the utility surpasses 4%. In ‘livestock’, the
effect is superior to very inferior allocations: around
2,700 m3 ha–1 results in increases of more than 20%.
And in the ‘mixed’ orientation, 2,050 m3 ha–1 increases
the utility by more than 3%.
In the Lower Ter, most remarkable is the elevated
utility increase of the ‘fruit’ orientation. For the interval
of supply between 6,000 and 1,350 m3 ha–1, the utilities
vary from 13% to 124%. The ‘livestock’ orientation
shows interesting effects for supplies lower than 2,800
m3 ha–1, the point at which the utility increase reaches
27%. On the other hand, the effect of the market is very
small in the ‘mixed’ and ‘corn’ orientations. In this last
case, for levels between 2,000 m3 ha–1 and 1,350 m3
ha–1, the utility increases from 6-10%.
In the Middle Ter the case of the ‘ornamental’
productive orientation can be emphasised. For a very
wide range of supply (from 5,450 to 2,600 m3 ha–1),
the utility increase is very high, varying between
70% and 110%. The ‘mixed’ orientation also obtains
high increases in its utility function. The ‘corn’
orientation obtains increases of 5% for allocations
of 5,050 m3 ha–1. Finally, the ‘livestock’ orientation
only obtains elevated increases of utility at low
levels of allocation: 2,600 m3 ha–1 corresponds to an
increase of 12%.
The existence of a water market, in situations of
limited water availability, improves the irrigator’s
utility and his economic gain, but generally the
increase in gain is quite moderate. For example, in the
zone of the Muga, in a situation of high restrictions
(supply of 18,400 m3 ha–1) (Table 7), the existence of
the intra-community market would increase the gross
margin of the zone by 36,800 € (7.05 € ha–1).
In addition, the gain improvement does not
compensate the reduction caused by the low amount
of water available, with respect to a year without
restrictions.
In the present situation, in cases of drought, the
hydraulic authority reduces the allocations to the
irrigators, granting different water quantities according
to production (fruit trees or other cultures), and this
produces conflicts between the different farm types.
The existence of water markets, associated with a
change of policy, granting equal allocations by hectare
for all irrigators, could facilitate a reassignment of the
resource among them, reducing these conflicts. In
contrast to allocation by administrative decision,
allocation by means of a market can provide
remuneration for farmers who stop using the water in
drought situations.
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Table 7. Comparison between the situations «with market» and «without market» in the Muga
zone (supply of 18,400 m3 100ha–1)
Without market With market
Corn
Gross margin (€ 100ha–1) 31,954.42 32,259.20
Labour (h ha–1) 663 610
MOTAD (risk estimator) 2,562,203 2,507,504
Livestock
Gross margin (€ 100ha–1) 19,980.50 20,395.54
Labour (h ha–1) 959 894
MOTAD (risk estimator) 853,547 819,541
Mixed
Gross margin (€ 100ha–1) 35,750.38 36,815.78
Labour (h ha–1) 1,830 3,442
MOTAD (risk estimator) 3,184,840 3,601,416
From a modelling point of view, the market seems to
be a feasible solution used at the intra-sectoral level to
solve problems of resource allocation in the case of
drought. Nevertheless, an important element to
consider is the effect of transaction costs that could
limit the transactions because they could considerably
diminish the benefit for the participants.
Analyses of the viability of the introduction of
intercommunitarian water markets in the Guadalquivir
and in the Duero were carried out by Garrido (2000)
and Martínez and Gómez-Limón (2004), respectively.
In both cases the authors conclude that water markets
improve the allocation of the resource from an
economic point of view, although the transaction costs
can limit their practical application. In both studies the
obtained results originate a more important economic
impact and water reassignment than that obtained in the
internal river basins of Catalonia.
Also, these authors suggest other reasons that can
limit the effectiveness of the market. The present
legislation does not develop in enough depth all of the
aspects related to the water market, and this can cause
insecurity. Also, the traditional belief that water is
common property and that it is not possible to buy or
sell it is firmly implanted in the irrigators’ minds.
Opinions of the irrigators
It is also important to know whether a water market
would be accepted in practice by the irrigators. As
Bjornlund (2003, p.58) indicates, «for water markets to
realise the above benefits, irrigation communities must
adopt the concept of markets, see their benefits and
possibilities and learn how to utilise them to their fullest
potential». The results of the interviews conducted
indicate that the communities of the Muga are the most
reticent about the establishment of markets (one of them
established a formal prohibition of the purchase, sale or
transfer of water in their Statutes.) The communities
of the Lower Ter show an intermediate position,
identifying the need for Administration control of the
transactions. In the Middle Ter, the transactions would be
accepted if economic compensation was provided for the
irrigators. These results seem to show that water markets
would be accepted differently from zone to zone.
However, Garrido et al. (1996) point out the
disadvantages for the people in question when faced
with a new situation that is in conflict with one which
has always been familiar. It is therefore necessary to be
careful when interpreting the irrigators’ opinions.
In fact, in studies carried out in other zones of the
world where the introduction of water markets is
recent, it has been observed that when the irrigators
obtain advantages from market participation, the use of
markets increases considerably in the initial years of
operation (Bjornlund, 2003). It is expected that a water
market in the zone of study, operating correctly, would
have a similar effect.
As conclusions, the water markets applied to the
internal river basins of Catalonia would guarantee an
optimal reassignment of the resource in situations of
supply restrictions. Although in the analysed zone they
would not imply very high economic gains with respect to
the situation without a market, they would avoid conflicts
between irrigators. The markets would favour the internal
water management organization of the agrarian sector,
transcending the problems caused by the performance of
the Administration, which grants different amounts of
water to the irrigators according to what they cultivate.
In addition, the introduction of the markets would
allow water management policy to be updated in
accordance with the Spanish legislation and in line with
the WFD that does not mention water markets
explicitly but promotes the use of economic tools in
water management. The main elements of doubt are the
irrigators’ practical acceptance of this new tool and the
transaction costs, related to the operative complexity of
the market.
The next logical step would be to analyse the
possibility of establishing an intersectoral market
between the irrigators and the municipalities in order to
guarantee the urban supply in case of drought.
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